Japans conditional surrender

Discussions of Japan's surrender as negotiated or not have mostly overlooked one significant fact: that the Potsdam declaration called for the unconditional surrender *of the Japanese armed forces*. So from the beginning of the back & forth (if we are not permitted to call them negotiations), the Japanese had reason to believe that the emperor system would be maintained. The call for 'unconditional surrender', in the case of Japan, itself came with a very significant concession.

all the best

The call for surrender could not legally have asked for anything more, as there was legitimate civilian government in place before the surrender terms were delivered and, finally, accepted. This was not the case with Germany, and is also why the administrative structures of the subsequent Occupations in Germany and Japan were different, i.e. one was directly governed by the Allied military; the other was governed by SCAP via the existing Japanese bureaucracy.

The Potsdam Declaration also stated:

'There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest'

Who precisely is covered by this is left to the discretion of the Allies. It's clear from sources cited by Mike Fester and others and those I've read, e.g., Dower's Embracing Defeat, that the Allies certainly included Hirohito. Perhaps some elements of the Japanese government harbored illusions as to who might or might not be covered. But that's all they were: illusions. You haven't presented convincing evidence otherwise.

Actually, it has not been overlooked. Indeed, both myself and others have pointed that the Japanese surrendered under the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. Indeed, I wrote several years ago, and you concurred

'Didn't the US change the terms of 'unconditional surrender' AFTER the bombs were dropped, to allow Japan to keep her Emperor? Doesn't THIS show the US was just delaying in order to drop the bombs?

The Japanese were NEVER given the demand of 'unconditional surrender' after Germany was defeated. At the Tehran conference, it was decided among the Allied powers to demand 'unconditional surrender' from the Axis powers, and that no Allied nation would make separate treaty with an Axis power. Until the Potsdam Declaration, no other terms were elucidated, though several attempts by the US to make contact with Japan were rebuffed. Potsdam, however, spelled out guarantees of economic, social, political, territorial, industrial and other nature, as well as called for the prosecution of war criminals. No mention is made of the Emperor. The Japanese refused these terms, though they clearly knew they were unconditional only in the military sense (the military did not want unconditional military surrender.) Note that the role of the Emperor is NOT addressed by the declaration. When the Japanese first signalled their intention to surrender, they attempted to insert a clause guaranteeing the retention of the Emperor. The US reply was calculated NOT to be a concession, and to remain true to the letter and spirit of Potsdam; it stated that the Emperor's status would be subject to the Allied Occupation commander's personal decision. The Japanese, with misgivings, chose to see this as a 'yes, you can keep your Emperor', but there is no guarantee or implication here. The Japanese at that time chose to trust in the good will of the US in this regard. In any event, the Japanese could have contacted the US at any time after the Potsdam Declaration to work out details; they did not, until after the Nagasaki blast. '

Uh, which concession?

I would characterize them as a shrewd conclusion borne out by experience. It's hard to argue with history.

all the best

Hmm, which 'shrewd conclusion' did the Japanese arrive at prior to this? They 'shrewdly' got themselves into a quagmire in China, which consumed nearly all their cash reserves and fuel reserves, then suffered a series of escalating embargoes at the hands of the one foreign power who had, historically, been most friendly towards them. They 'shrewdly' provoked a war with the USSR, though it ended up being little more than a border skirmish (with about 10,000 dead.), then 'shrewdly' got themselves locked into a life-or-death struggle with the world's biggest economic and military power, with no easy way to bring the war to their soil. They 'shrewdly' failed to begin negotiations in 1943 or 1944, when it was obvious they had lost, but might have been able to actually get some terms at the bargainning table. They 'shrewdly' turned down all offers of intermediaries in 1945 and 'shrewdly' decided to place their hopes on the good nature of Stalin. They 'shrewdly' ignored the Potsdam Declaration, and 'shrewdly' got 2 of their cities nuked for their cleverness.

I must admit, you are perhaps the first person to use the word 'shrewd' WRT the Japanese leadership at the time, and not use it as a contrast.

Then why do you try? You claimed that _Japan's Longest Day_ bears out your contention that the Japanese viewed the Byrnes' note as a concession/guarantee, when in fact quite clearly on page 48, it states (speaking of Suzuki) 'Old, confused by the events of the past few days, and vacillatory by nature, he was soon persuaded that the American reply meant, in reality, THE END OF THE IMPERIAL STRUCTURE' (emphasis mine.)

Could you please explain how this is synonymous with 'they viewed it as a guarantee of Hirohito and his position'?

Then why are you doing so?

The historical record is pretty clear: the Allies made no guarantees; they seriously considered deposing Hirohito; they kept him around because they thought it would be advantageous.