Joint Occupation of Germany?

The occupation of Germany was supposed to be a joint endevor, but before the occupation began, each side (French, British, US, SU) was assigned an area of which it would be the administrator. Was this always the plan? Was their every a plan that the occupation would be truly joint, that is all the powers occupying all of Germany at the same time? Or did war time conditions (getting your troops on the ground) mean that everyone expected the division that we got?

The basic occupation map was drawn at the Yalta Conference Feb. 1946 of Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill. Capital cities (Vienna and Berlin) were assigned to 4-power occupation and the rest of German and Austrian territory assigned to separate national occupation zones. In theory, these countries would be occupied until a peace treaty was signed. This happened for Austria in 1954 (?). No peace treaty for Germany was ever signed.

The BRD and DDR (West and East Germany) developed in 1949 out of currency reforms, the Cold War, etc.

Was it? I find it hard to believe that even in the flush of victory, anyone was so naive as to believe that Russia, and to a lesser extent France, would be content to have only a share in a four-party government. Both these nations had a very strong motive to occupy the territory closest to their borders (widely interpreted in the case of Russia).

If the country was supposed to be governed jointly, and not by zones, then why was it necessary to form a separate (and zoned) government for Berlin?

all the best

The occupation zones roughly corresponded to the operational area that each power was in when Germany was overrun in April 1945. This meant that the Brits, Yanks, French, and Soviets each paid for the turf they occupied. This factored into Eisenhower's decision not to take Berlin ahead of the Russians. He didn't want to spill copious American blood just to hand over the capital to the Soviets, but rather to let their boys get killed..which hundreds of thousands did. Interesting to note that Patton wanted the occupation zones amended to the cease fire lines of 7 May 1945 and that rather than leave the so-called Soviet zone that we should've told them to 'go to hell'.

While true, you overlook the reason. If you know the eventual borders, why risk the lives of your troops to capture territory you are going to give back.

Well, one reason is loot! Look at the loot taken by the US Army. in Jena; and much more. The Zones were withdrawn into by July 1, 1945. The US Army withdrew from the USSR areas; the French, who had nothing (relating to the territory they captured) got their zone (100% from the USA). The French were very interested in the number of slaves (German PoWs) they obtained. The French did an 'inventory', one of the more fundimental sources of the numbers of German PoWs who were no longer there.

I don't think that the British ever did anything more than *hope* that the USSR would honour the occupation agreements, and Churchill is on record as saying that if matters had been left to him, he would never have given them any *legitimate* role in post-war Germany for exactly this reason.

However, while Britain had deep suspicions of the USSR throughout WW2, Roosevelt was far more naive. The US was eager to co-operate with Stalin even at the expense of Anglo-US solidarity, and whatever the British felt, Roosevelt was determined to co-operate with the USSR in this way. It is worth recalling that Roosevelt and his following at this time actually regarded the USSR and China as more fitting post-war partners for the US than the 'old colonial power' of the BCE, and went out of their way to promote Soviet and Chinese interests at the expense of British.

In addition, of course, in 1943 the Red Army was making massive advances in eastern Europe whereas the Anglo-US landings in Italy had only just occurred and D-Day was still a year away. Even by September 1944 the Western Allies had apparently stalled on the German borders while the Red Army steamroller advanced through Rumania and the borders of East Prussia. It seemed throughout this period as if the Red Army might end the war in possession of most of Germany, and thus the British at least felt that any agreed occupation plan that protected Western interests was better than nothing.

This being the case, the British attempted to take the initiative and devise a solution which put at least some of Germany under Western occupation. The occupation zones for post-war Germany were thus first devised by a British Cabinet Committee in March 1943. The British recommendations were then approved in principle by the Soviet-US-British European Advisory Council in July 1943, and firmly approved as between the British and US authorities at Quebec in September 1944.

At Yalta in 1945, the occupation zones agreed in July 1943 were endorsed by all parties for a variety of reasons. Firstly, Stalin (according to Bullock) was anxious to stick to pre-agreed terms because, contrary to expectations and to Eisenhower's wishes, Allied armies had in fact advanced swiftly inside eastern and central Germany and were now some hundreds of miles east of the 1943/44 demarcation lines. What Stalin did not want was a confrontation with Allied troops, because Stalin had no wish to fight a war with the West just yet. For that reason, Stalin prevaricated over Poland and other issues, declining direct confrontation, baiting the British but placing the US, and yet declining to yield and important point and securing his position on the ground. The result was a diplomatic triumph for Stalin exceeding anything achieved by Hitler in the 1930's: the US hoodwinked and the British neutralised while the Soviet Union annexed half of Europe by military force.

The US under Roosevelt and Truman readily acquiesced in the Soviet attitude, announcing publicly that the bulk of US troops would leave Europe within a few months of VE Day, indicating to the British that they intended to give up all occupation roles by 1950, and that US troops would abandon all ground in advance of the Tehran-agreed demarcation zones. The US thus withdraw from the bulk of central Germany and western Czechoslovakia and handed it over to Soviet troops - who stayed for 50 years.

In view of the determined yet absurdly blinkered US attitude, and with Eisenhower firmly in the pro-Soviet camp , Britain could do little. The Soviets were denied an North Sea outlet and Denmark saved from Soviet occupation by a rapid thrust to Lubeck, and in the south Eighth Army forestalled Tito's Moscow-inspired bid to capture Trieste. On the other hand, preparations were made for recently-disarmed German forces to be reconstituted to fight any Soviet invasion of NW Europe, and France was hurriedly given an occupation role so as to share the immense load of administering post-war Western Germany once the US left Europe.

It was not for three or four years that Truman and the US administration woke up to the damning and gigantic error they had made, by which time it was far too late to redress the matter.

[as agreed at Yalta, Feb. 1945 (obviously not 1946, my typo)]: 1. Occupation zones were assigned on a common-sense basis, e.g. the French zones (2 of them) contiguous with the French border, Russian zone in eastern Germany, British zone nearest the North Sea ports, USA elsewhere (but with its own port in the British zone.)

2. This alone would have placed both capitals (Berlin and Vienna) in the Russian zone. Because capitals have obvious importance and are relatively small, for similar common- sense reasons (a) a single 4-power occupation system was designed, (b) with each power taking it in turns (monthly) to have general responsibility. But all the powers were represented all the time. This was why you saw (e.g. in famous fictional movie Harry Lime) police jeeps manned all the time by one French, one US, one British and one Russian MP.

The proof that this worked well enough was that the 'Berlin Blockade' was never extended to Austria and an Austrian peace treaty was negotiated (1954?) which ended the 4-power occupation of that country. This was a welcome sign that, after Stalin's death, Russian policy would be less

Rubbish. The occupation zones were agreed in July 1943. long before the Allied enemy soldier set foot inside Germany. At the time the zones were set they were seen as advantageous to the West as the USSR was expected to overrun Germany before the Anglo-US troops got there. What happened in practice is that weak German resistance in the West and fanatical German resistance in the East allowed Anglo-US troops to advance as far as they liked: US troops over-ran the demarcation zone borders in central Germany by 150 miles, penetrating into Czechoslovakia on the 'other side' of Germany; US-Anglo-Canadian troops reached and could easily have crossed the demarcation line in the north, even reaching Berlin, and in the South US troops penetrated Austria and could have overrun it if allowed.

Britain argued that flagrant Soviet breaches of agreements over Poland and the eastern border of Germany should be redressed by Allied troops holding their positions until the Soviets observed their treaty requirements. Roosevelt and Truman refused, on Marshall and Eisenhower's advice, and US troops gave up tens of thousands of square miles of German territory which the Red Army then occupied and, of course, held on to for 50 years.

The post-war division of Germany into two nations was an avoidable situation brought on by incompetent and inept US policy-making in the face of Soviet aggression and

Good grief. What a phantasamagoric view of history you have!

all the best

Do you have any idea what was taken from the mines southwest of Eisenach? What was taken from Quedlinburg? What happened to Zeiss/Jena? Is it your position that the US Army just 'got lucky'? Did the US Army have art recovery officers? (Forget the fact that they also stole for their own pocket. Some of the recoveries of this property [sold, yes sold, back to the Germans] have received news coverage, but not a lot, as it would upset those who still have their loot.)

I suggest that the US Army knew quite well what to look for, and had an organization set up to 'loot'. While you are about it, include the Salzburg coin collection. Salzburg was still in German hands at the end of the war, but the looting did not stop.

Whether it was stealing wristwatches from PoWs or looting museums, churches and bomb shelters, the US was very good at it.