US Army Supply European Theater of operations part 4 of 6

Autumn arrives early, bringing cool wet weather and triggering the need for winter clothing, which is slow to arrive. The jerrican situation is considered so important a US/British, Allied Container Advisory Committee is set up to match requirements with supply.

During September and October Washington replies to the theatre^Òs request for 7 million jerricans, stating that the request should be reduced to 5.4 million, since production could not exceed that figure by the end of the year. A resumption of US production would be handicapped by a shortage of manpower and deliveries delayed by the 120 days required for production and shipment. So it was British supplies and finding the lost jerricans or nothing. When learning this the British agree to a maximum production effort and in 1945 will exceed their commitments, as will the US, but this does not help in September.

During September and on through the Autumn the supply system crisis generated the usual set of problems that helped make things worse. Armies tried to build up their own depots so they could control more of their own supplies, the usual just in case stocks, so over ordered. The standing requests for supplies, the daily allocations, were followed even though it meant the known delivery of unwanted items, the usual backorder problem appeared (Army orders, missing items on backorder, Army reorders when items do not appear, missing items in reorder added to backorders, repeat cycle generating apparently huge supply needs), it was taking 10 to 15 days to fill supply requests and arrivals were so fragmented it was hard to figure out just which order had been filled. COMZ persistently overestimated its transport abilities meaning the transport to build up COMZ depots was always too small. It should be noted the armies learnt to live with the reduced supplies and many of the shortages were more on paper than real but the real shortages were bad enough. The backorder system would become so bad that eventually the order was made to cancel all backorders and for the armies to submit a new consolidated list of outstanding requirements. The losing or diversion of supplies becomes so bad armies assign expediters to follow their shipments, in 1st Army the Ordnance officer had 100 such ^Ófield agents^Ô acting to ensure his shipments arrived, such practice would continue until at least January. The practice of sending army trucks to the rear for specific supplies would continue probably until the end of the war, despite a mid March 1945 COMZ order to end the system unless by mutual agreement.

As far as I can find in the histories in the September October period the US contributions to 21st Army Group supplies consisted of the Red Lion, at around 1/10 the daily tonnage of the Red ball, 8 out of over 150 US truck companies with 18,000 tons of supplies plus the airlift tonnage of around 5,000 tons. It should be pointed out the Red Lion was a more efficient route, more tons/truck/day, probably due to being a shorter run, so diverting it to US troops would not have meant 18,000 tons of supplies to 12th Army group. There is also the foregone airlift tonnage since the aircraft were assigned to Market Garden but overall in September the US lift to 21st Army group was around 14,000 tons. This was over a day of 12th Army groups supply requirements of 11,500 tons/day at the end of August and less than a day of 12th Army groups projected daily supply requirements for early October of 18,800 tons/day, assuming similar tonnages could be lifted to US forces that were further away from their supply dumps using the same trucks. This US tonnage has to be offset against the loan by 21st Army group to 12th of the equivalent of around 6 to 7 truck companies in August.

There is no record in the logistics histories of any major diversions of US supply capacity to 21st Army group in the period August to October 1944. It is clear from the hints in the histories and British sources 21st Army Group had the better supply situation, closer to the ports, plus I believe less supplies per divisional slice and closer to its depots in Normandy (the average US distance appears to be around 1/3 more thanks in part to the US depots at St Lo versus 21st Army Group at Caen), also the US logistics history makes it clear 21st Army group was expected to be able to attack on D+90 when the US forces would need around another 30 days to resume the attack.

The reality is 12th Army group was stopped by a lack of supplies and German opposition, not diversion of supplies to 21st Army group. It should be noted it took the airlift, admittedly not at full strength, around a month to shift in the supplies needed to keep 12th Army group going for 2 days in August and a day and a half in October. The extra tonnage would be nice, but it would not put the 12th Army Group on the Rhine unless the Germans agreed. It was in part the price to pay for the isolation of the beach head by the allied air forces, the US in particular had to cross the rail desert.

The failure to properly train the supply units alone probably cost the US forces more supplies than diversions to 21st Army Group, for example a lack of lubricants could be made up by air supply a lack of diesel or of standard fuel could not, the armies wanted too much. Then add the combat troops contributions, since they had not been trained in pursuit in making incorrect requests, then add the hijackings and fuel drains. Add also the lack of quick cycling of jerricans or worse still their casual abandonment. Finally add the too low replacement rates for equipment, (see below end December). If say a million jerricans left in Normandy had been filled and forwarded in September that would still only be about 4 days supply for the combat troops and the Red Ball express, not enough for Berlin and probably the Rhine. If another million of the 3.5 million missing cans had been kept in circulation one more time it would have added another 4 days supply, assuming there was transport available, which is unlikely.

The armies were also using more fuel than was arriving on the continent, this is disguised by the way the transport lift gave out before the POL supplies. Add more transport lift you add more demand for fuel reducing that available for combat operations, so in reality there was no way the US Army was going to end up deep in Germany in 1944. The Red Ball express alone was using about 1/3 the fuel that 12th Army Group was using.

It should also be noted the POL airlifted from England ran into the jerrican problem, unless there was a reasonable replacement rate of empties going back to England most of the cargo aircraft would be unable to shift fuel.

The supply system tried to follow the plan laid out for Overlord, selecting then stocking depots behind the armies despite the speed of the advance. This wasted transport lift taking supplies from one effectively inaccessible dump to another. It was only after Paris was taken that the decision was taken to effectively abandon the supply plan until the armies stopped, simply move the ADSEC/Army supply boundary forward according to where the rail links terminated but do not turn today^Òs boundary into the next big supply dump. This then became the new standard system during October, in effect the supply system was set up for a static situation or slow advance during the pursuit and then for a pursuit for the static situation or slow advance after the pursuit had ended. It took weeks before the armies would finally admit the idea the halt was more than a temporary pause.

The US armies stopped pursuit where they did thanks to inadequate transport resources, poor supply discipline, poor supply system training, allied and German demolition of transport infrastructure and German resistance. There would be a second chance, the advance across Germany in 1945, to see how many of the lessons learnt in France had been absorbed.

When you see just the strain on the shipping it really does become very hard to justify Market Garden, let alone not attempting the objective of trapping as much of 15th army as possible while opening Antwerp. It must rate as one of the major allied failures. Ignoring the Berlin and Rhur ideas for the moment in early September the allies had two choices, try and continue the pursuit to clear in at least one area the natural and man made obstacles that formed the German border with France and the low countries, or use the forces to clear the ports needed for a major offensive later in Autumn or in Winter. Whichever attack was chosen first would obviously have the advantage the current German disorganisation. The border defences in front of the allies could be quite strong, as the next 6 months would prove, so you can clearly see why an attack to punch a hole through them was very tempting, let alone the idea of a German morale collapse. The forces attacking Antwerp were going away from Germany. The choice was made and it was wrong, but the choice was supported from the top down.

The final point is the allied armies went over to pursuit in the order 3rd Army, 1st Army, 21st Army Group, and that is basically the order they stopped pursuit. The armies could only go so far before pausing to create a supply system behind them before launching another major attack.

Yes folks, the LST determined much about when, where and in what strength the invasion would be done and the jerrican numbers and the trucks to transport them determined how far the subsequent pursuit would go. A tanker truck division was worth more in France in September 1944 than any armoured division.

In October the US occupies 90% of the Paris Hotels, COMZ HQ has 169 hotels, Seine Base Section 129 and SHAEF plus OSS plus USN plus ATC have about 25 between them. Taking over so much of the accommodation creates friction with the French. The surviving Mulberry B was partially winterised and became

Good stuff, and commendable research, but this is all a bit above my head, and too long to digest in comfort.

Suggest you get hold of a copy of Chester Wilmot's 'Struggle For Europe', where he analyses the supply problems V the campaign options quite succinctly.

He concluded that Patton's influence on Eisenhower was a crucial factor; in that a dead end strategy (long LOC to Metz) degraded the possibilty of getting into the Ruhr the short way in 1944, and crippling German war production. This is of course the 'Monty' argument, but CW concluded that Monty's strategy was sound, even if his diplomacy was not. Incidentally, CW did not think failure at Arnhem itself too significant; the salient created could have been exploited A) to cut off the German forces in Western Holland, to mount a thrust Eastwards towards Dusseldorf (along the W bank of the Rhine). That's what Monty wanted to do, and convinced Eisenhower, but the politics did not work out(Sept 1944). Arnhem failure something of a red herring, question was 'what next?'

The then problem was supplying Hodge's 1st US Army which had already fallen behind the British 2nd Army in the drive through Belgium, due to supply problems.

The real problem was political - with a predominance of US troops, the US Generals had to be 'seen', back home to be winning the war. Eisenhower had to respond to this, hence the 'broad front' strategy (which was no strategy) and, more or less, supply to the loudest cry; no prizes for guessing who's that was.

If we forget about the personalities, and accept that supplies were (as you say) the most important factor, and consider the geography of late 1944, it is difficult to sustain an argument that the main thrust into Germany should have been through Lorraine and the Saar (a mountainous region) on long LOC, rather than through Holland and the Roer (flat country) on much shorter LOC.

The delays which resulted gave the Germans an opportunity to recoup, which they exploited vigorously; the 'Battle of The Bulge' was the result, producing dividends only for the Soviet Union (Their January offensive was greatly helped by the degradation of the Heer on the Ostfront by resources diverted to the Ardennes). WW2 went on for another 8 months.

The principal architect of this was General Patton, who had been Eisenhower's boss 25 years before. I would not trust Patton's memoirs too much - he greatly exagerrated his army's achievments, like any general, and also his supply problems

Cheers

Andrew Sanders:

Can you substantiate any of that?

Secondly, Patton didn't write any memoirs. 'War as I Knew it' was put together by his wife after his death.

Wilmot notes Eisenhower was talking 600 to 700 tons a day for a reinforced division in combat as a maximum figure and decides this is excessive in the circumstances of a pursuit. The trouble is Wilmot assumes the operations up to and including the Rhur would be a pursuit. What about things like the equipment needed to assault across the Rhine and then bridge it? In 1945 the US Army had to demolish houses to move the bridging gear.

Based on the first 4 months of combat SHAEF calculates the daily supply requirements as 541 tons per divisional slice in normal combat, 426 tons if regrouping or negotiating natural obstacles and 462 tons in a rapid advance. Of the 541 tons the division itself consumed 223 tons and the rest by corps and army overheads. The above figures appear to exclude supplies for the air force, being calculations for supply of the ground forces. In addition COMZ uses 231 tons of supplies daily per divisional slice which may include the air force supplies.

The above was US Army, Montgomery's advance beyond the Rhine assumed 400 tons per day according to Wilmot, using 20 US and UK divisions to capture the Rhur, 14,000 tons per day of supply, using the transport aircraft as well as land supply, with 2,000 tons going to Patton. As of 1st September the allied forces across the Seine totalled 30 divisions. It should be noted Patton was receiving around 3,500 tons per day. So apparently the 1,500 tons per day, or 4 divisions at 400 tons per day, is the decisive difference, making Market Garden unstoppable before the other side of the Rhur.

Where were these 4 divisions to be deployed, given the initial assault was one bridge wide? How could these have helped ensure the initial thrust would succeed, and Arnhem bridge would be open in allied hands. It is a good clue about the supply situation that the allies really needed the bridges, instead of forcing crossings elsewhere.

Note the transport aircraft can be doing supply runs or airborne operations, not both at the same time. On the figures I have, the aircraft best performance over a week was around 1,000 tons per day, the problem was often reception capacity, not aircraft numbers. Withdraw most the airlift to use the 3 airborne divisions, and there goes half of the apparently decisive extra supply lift needed to make the Rhur.

Wilmot assumes the fuel pipelines reaching a particular location means the fuel in the pipeline has reached that location, also running a train to a location is proof the rail system was working properly to that location.

12th Army group supply arrangements during September 1944. At start of month receiving 11,000 tons/day, of which 4,000 was for the airforce. Daily allocations,

5th September 7,000 tons for ground troops 50:50 1st:3rd armies. 14th September as before but next 1,500 tons/day to 1st army. 21st September 3,500 tons to 3rd, 700 tons to 9th, rest to 1st (with a minimum of 5,000 tons) 27th September 5,400 tons for 1st, 3,100 to 3rd (1st had 10 divisions, 3rd had 8)

Note the 4,000 tons for the air force, Wilmot seems to have assumed supplies to 12th Army Group were all for the ground forces. Also it appears his supply calculations make no allowances for things like replacement vehicles and large amounts of spare parts, given the wear and tear already becoming visible.

The US Army was down to 2 weeks supply of some major artillery ammunition types in mid September.

Wilmot ignores the fact the transport delivering the supplies meant units were withdrawn from the ports, cutting unloading. He further assumes the system had the capacity to supply, and was supplying, the correct mix of supplies, the average US division slice was using around 2/3 more fuel than the planning figure. Montgomery reduced his transport in the rear areas to the point where only half the daily supply consumption was being unloaded at the ports, this was not sustainable for say two months, September and October.

Wilmot makes much of the supplies delivered to 3rd Army, which begs the question why wasn't more progress made it the supplies were that adequate? Later he notes it cost more to supply 3rd Army given the supply routes, but that is different to noting the supplies had arrived.

Arnhem to Dortmund is around 75 miles, Aachen to Dortmund is around 80 miles, taking the Rhur on a narrow thrust would extend the allied front maybe 100 more miles.

Finally the supply situation in October has to be noted, since it would be during October the Rhur would be sealed off then defended against the inevitable counter attacks, and historically the supply lines were shorter than the proposed Rhur advance.

It is quite interesting to note Wilmot criticises the Market Garden attack as too narrow because of the broad front.

Sending units south of the Ardennes would not really help a drive on the Rhur. It is one thing to say the strategy was sound, that is aim for an important target, the problem is whether the forces present could achieve the aim.

If the salient could have been exploited why wasn't it? Why was there such a supply problem that all the allied forces stalled during the October to December period? Why are there examples of German counter attacks pushing the allies back? Why did 21st Army Group need 12th Army group to support the attacks? Why was 1st Army attacking a powerful distraction but not 3rd?

Wilmot cannot claim going to the Rhur was possible and then have the US Army falling behind well short of the Rhur due to supply problems.

There is the fundamental reality that you can only put so many supplies down a particular road, rail or air link.

This is the standard charge against Eisenhower, he should have somehow concentrated on a more narrow front, presumably north of the Ardennes, but if he did that so could the Germans for a start. There were limits about how many allied units could operate in a given area. There were limits on what the allies thought about how bad the German defeat was, did it mean a great advance was possible or not? Broad fronts means things like more roads and rail lines to choose from, they are appropriate at times, like say Barbarossa. France could be liberated with less effort in 1944, thanks to help from the French, local information, even standing guard to let the allied units rest, hunting down the inevitable German stragglers and so on. Germany would require the assumption the population would be hostile, not friendly, with all that implies for occupation duties and securing supply lines.

The pro US charge ignores the way the US 9th Army spent so much time under 21st Army group, this is usually cited as proof he was pro UK.

How many major rivers was Market Garden supposed to cross again? How good was the supply line to Normandy given no Antwerp?

When the allies framed their Overlord plans they assumed a 1918 like advance, a steady retreat by the Germans. The allies found their supply requirements indicated they needed to open up many ports, but a steady advance minimised the need for truck lift. Given this there was no way the allies could sustain a pursuit much further than they did. When you look at the situation in April 1945 even with more resources and experience 175 miles was the economic limit for US Army truck supply.

The 8 extra months assumes 4 extra active divisions, at less than pursuit supply requirements, would make all the difference to 1st and 2nd Armies making another 70 to 80 miles and surrounding then occupying the Rhur, all that urban area, with the possibility of the German forces historically sent to Warsaw being used to counter attack, with some of the