Why did U.S. keep going after Japanese on islands

after we had taken the airfields and pushed out far enough keep the airfields out of range of artillery? Would it have not been better to just bunker down and force the Japanese to attack our fortifications? After all, having cut off their food resupply, they would starve in time so they would be force to go on the offensive tactically, while being on the defensive strategically.

Allowing large numbers of enemy troops to remain available to attack your facilities is not a good military tactic. They would still have been able to engage in commando style attacks against airfields and other installations, making effective use of them impossible.

tim gueguen 101867

Such a containment strategy is sometimes viable, but it has severe disadvantages. You have to maintain significant fighting forces which are better deployed on active fronts elsewhere. You are constrained in using the areas for supply bases, lest the dumps become the subject of attack. The presence of enemy forces in the area means a steady attrition on the defensive perimeter

Further it means that there is substantial real estate that is a restricted zone for aircraft, which can be shot at and where any pilots who have to crash-land or bail out can be captured. And also, the enemy forces are a source of intelligence, reporting back to their headquarters on your activities.

But in spite of these disadvantages, such a strategy was sometimes followed. For example, the Japanese base at Rabaul was not taken even though Allied troops had pushed up to it on New Britain

Look at how many men it would force you to keep on hand on each island, if the Japanese did launch a Counter Offensive. Not to mention we were securing the islands for airfields so our B-29's could be closer to Tokyo, we couldn't have put the bombers there safely without the clearing out of all Japanese. Most airfields were deep into the islands, so you would have to set a complete perimeter around that airfield, with enough men to take on the an offensive. Just imagine the manpower it would take to secure Okinawa just to get our troops ashore and keep them safe. The Japanese had a soldier hold out till 1974 thinking the war wasn't over, I know that is only one, but that is how they were. It would have took years to starve them out. Just my thoughts.

The maximum range of a Type 38 or Type 99 Arisaka is well over 1000 yards.

How can you effectively operate an airfield with people out of sight shooting the planes, pilots and ground crew?

What if instead of doing banzai charges, they infiltrated the lines and attacked the aircraft with grenades and demolition charges? Remember, they didn't much are if they got killed as long as they took an airplane with them.

Although y ou are correct in saying that they would starve, eventually, it would have cost more lives on both sides. You said 'after we had taken the airfields and pushed out far enough to keep them out of artillery,' i'm assuming you mean the Pacific islands such as Iwo Jima and the lot. ITs my understanding that, had the US let up at all during the pacific campaign, it would have given the JApanes more time to recruit more soldiers and build more ships/planes and basically resize their army. The Japanese were nearly routed at this point, morally and physically. If the US had stopped taking over Pacific islands, I believe it would have given the Japanese a moral boost ('Hey, maybe they're afraid....' and also given them time to build up.

Although you are correct in pointing out that they would be on the defensive strategically an offense tactically, which would be bad for their command structure, again, it would have cost more lives. That woudl have dragged the war on longer, which woudl have meant more battles and more losses for both sides.

I also believe that the US needed to be absolutely sure that when then Enola Gay took off from whatever airfield it did, there weren't going to be ANY other japanese forces in the area that could threaten it.

-Brad

No. The Japanese were forced to fight a defensive war after Midway and look what happened to them. If the Allies had just waited for Japan to attack it's defenses, the Japanese would have taken that time to gain strength before attacking.

Let's say hypothetically that you're referring to the Solomons. The Americans are still hell-bent on retaking the Phillipines back from the Japanese ASAP, thereby requiring an offensive strategy continuing towards New Guniea. Just one way to look at it, many more.

HTH,

First off, I think most of you have good arguments. But, I also believe you misunderstood. I was NOT saying to stop invading other islands, or to keep on the offensive, but on the islands where one COULD push out past cannon range, why not play the same game the Japanese did. Notice, it Japanese did not 'bunker down' until after Saipan (with the exception of maybe Bunda, but then they were basically trapped there).

Take Okinawa or Peleliu, where after we took the airfields and quite a bit of real estate, we ended up with a very costly cave-to-cave fight that in some ways reminds me of Gettysburg.

If you have read Sledge's book, 'With the Old Breed' you might see how costly that was, and maybe a better tactic would be to force them to 'banzi' you back as you can be resupplied, while they cannot. Other islands, like Tarawa and Titian, I can see are to small to get past artillery range, but several of the islands were.

In fact, an argument might be made to on purposely allow an island you are attacking, one rather close to Japanese re-supply positions, not be covered to heavily by the fleet or air arm so as to encourage them to re-supply, while attacking them by air or surface units, in short, bleed them dry.

We, the U.S. had a huge advantage in production, with no way for the Japanese to catch up. The Japanese produced less than 10,000 A6Ms, less than 10,000 Ki-43s, I believe no more than 7 carriers, and just very low numbers for all types of equipment, while we produced over 100,000 fighters during the war, 100 aircraft carriers, we alone produced over 50,000 Sherman tanks (funny thing is, the Germans did not produced even 10,000 tanks while the USSR produced over 50,000 T-34s alone).

After Saipan, the Japanese did NOT have a way to resupply islands we had taken (they even had a hard time re-supplying Guadalcanal), so basically they were isolated (if you feel they were not, then the whole point of island hopping would be unsound as they could withdraw their forces from any island out there, and history has shown they could not).

Notice we isolated a huge portion of the Japanese army in China, with no way for them to get back to Japan to help defend their own motherland (I believe over one million troops they had in China).

Yes, we were 'hell bent' on taking islands. But I wonder, like Longstreet at Gettysburg and Rommel in the desert, maybe being strategically on the offensive, but tactically on the defensive is a better way.

Maybe so, Paul, but wouldn't that be much like moving into an old house and hiring the exterminators to eradicate half of the killer bees under the back porch, while using just the front door? Then having the exterminators hang around to see if the remaining bees continued to be a problem in the months to come? Why not clean 'em all out and let the exterminators go on to other houses while the house is refurbished and primarily maintained by other, smaller organizations? Besides, challenging the policies of an icon in charge, like MacArthur, doesn't get one a memorial bust at 'The Point' even if one's the CIC.

It happened, as you suggest, on one island

<< > after we had taken the airfields and pushed out far enough keep the

Allowing large numbers of enemy troops to remain available to attack your facilities is not a good military tactic. They would still have been able to engage in commando style attacks against airfields and other installations, making effective use of them impossible.>>

Actually, this was the plan on Bouganville, where it worked well enough, in the Philippines (where force levels were such that Japanese resistance was minimal once the initial campaign had been fought, and was to be employed on Kyushu (where only the southern half of the island was slated for initial occupation, this to serve for airbasing for the final campaign against Hoshu.

Terry L. Stibal